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Abstract: 
The U.S. – ROK alliance is currently on a high after a decade of fluctuating relations. 
Both the Obama and Lee administrations have been focused on producing a future 
plan that takes both nations strategic interests into account while also considering 
the changing dynamics in the region. The alliance partners have had to overcome 
differences of opinion on foreign policy, the rise of anti-Americanism in South Korea, 
the emergence of China as a power in the region, and the continuing nuclear 
ambitions and instability in North Korea. This paper discusses how the realignment 
of the force command structure and a unified long-term strategic plan, has effectively 
modified the USFK to better deal with these wide ranging issues and remain a force 
of strategic relevance now and in the future of Asia. The USFK therefore remains an 
important part of the U.S. – ROK alliance that has positive security implications for 
both the Korean Peninsula and its surrounding region. It has also become the 
catalyst for stronger all-round relations between the long-time allies, which lead to 
positive flow-on effects in economic matters such as the U.S. – ROK Free-Trade 
Agreement (KORUS FTA).     
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Introduction 
In the year of the Korean War armistice in 1953, Washington drafted a bilateral 
security treaty with the U.S. aligned Republic of Korea. This in effect was a unilateral 
defence guarantee, a pledge to protect the ROK from the communist Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea and its allies. The agreement saw the establishment of a 
permanent military presence in the ROK. Together with successive strong-armed 
military governments spanning 28 years, backed by the U.S., and led by Rhee 
Syngman and Park Chung-Hee, South Korea rose from the rubble of the war to 
become the world’s 13th largest economy.  
However while economic development flourished under tightly controlled military 
leadership along with U.S. policy advice and support, the people began to speak out 
against the oppressive government. A series of mass demonstrations and civil unrest 
during the 1970s and 1980s led to constitutional reform and a series of firsts. These 
included the first free direct presidential election of 1987, the first non-military 
president elected in 1992, and the first time a leader of the opposition was elected as 
president in 2002. Throughout this post-war period, the constants remained support 
from the U.S. government (albeit to varying degrees), and aggressive antagonism 
from the North. 
The introduction of Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy in 1997 brought about a radical 
change in inter-Korean relations, with unconditional engagement favoured over the 
hard-line policy promoted by U.S. advisers and conservative governments of the 
past. Although this led to improved relations between the two Korea’s, it caused a rift 
in the U.S. – ROK alliance as the allies disagreed on how to deal with the North and 
preserve the security of the region. The revelation that North Korea had been 
developing a nuclear weapons programme in 2003 only exacerbated the growing 
criticism of the Sunshine Policy. For the first time since its inception the USFK’s 
future came under serious threat as the long-term alliance partners’ strategic plans 
for the future began to diverge.            
The election of Lee Myung-Bak as president in 2008 brought with it a renewed focus 
on U.S. – ROK relations. The continued presence of the USFK in South Korea was 
confirmed as part of the long-term security strategy of both alliance partners. This 
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had followed a decade of alliance uncertainty as successive progressive 
governments used the Sunshine Policy to distance themselves from the defence 
strategy that had become enshrined in South Korea, during the military rule that 
followed the signing of the armistice. The ‘Myung-Bak (MB) Policy’ took a hard-line 
approach to inter-Korean relations, imposing sanctions and halting aid in response to 
the North’s belligerence and continuing nuclear ambitions.  
The two different policy approaches became the subject of debate within South 
Korea and between key stakeholders such as the U.S. and China. Opponents of the 
MB Policy argued that it created tension between the Koreas and gave too much 
decision making power to the U.S., reducing the likelihood of diplomacy and 
threatening the possibility of peaceful reunification. Opponents of the Sunshine 
Policy argued that the unconditional engagement policy allowed the North to pursue 
its nuclear programme without fear of repercussion, placing the future of the USFK at 
risk by alienating the U.S and threatening the long-term security of South Korea. The 
Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents of 2010 and the death of Kim Jong-Il raised 
further questions, while domestically the impending 2012 presidential election and 
public perceptions of the U.S. – ROK alliance had the same unsettling effect.  
This paper seeks to establish the long-term feasibility of the U.S. Military Presence in 
South Korea by analysing a number of domestic and international factors. It will 
illustrate how public perceptions in South Korea of the security provided by the 
USFK, have become more positive since the establishment of North Korea’s nuclear 
ambitions and the incidents of 2010. The rise of China and its effect on the security 
dynamics of the region will be examined, as well the effects its patronage of the 
North has on the U.S. – ROK’s strategic planning. Another major factor in securing 
the future of the USFK has been the renewed strategic focus on East Asia by the 
U.S. post-Afghanistan. The unveiling of the U.S.’ long-term defence plan pinpointed 
the Asia-Pacific as its new focal point for defence strategy, as well as announcing 
plans to drastically reduce its troops in the Middle-East by the end of 2012. This 
effectively guaranteed the continuing U.S. military commitment to the Korean 
Peninsula and assuaged any fears that the USFK would pull out during a crucial 
transitional period in the region.  
Page 6 of 63 
 
My research will analyse the relationship between the four main stakeholders on the 
Korean Peninsula and how these dynamics affect factors that determine the 
continued presence of the USFK such as popular opinion, foreign policy, security 
concerns and regional security needs. These factors are also used to explain the 
strategic motives behind the long-term plans of the U.S. – ROK alliance and how 
these plans establish the continuing feasibility of the USFK.   
The section on the effects of anti-Americanism in South Korea, analyses how the 
public’s view of the USFK has affected relations between the alliance partners and 
influenced joint defence policy. A specific focus will be placed on the changing 
attitudes of the Korean public as a result of various factors. From the negative views 
against the USFK because of its links with the oppressive military government, to the 
positive views during the MB era as a result of the deterrence factor provided by the 
USFK against renewed North Korean aggression.  
The changing nature of the regional security environment and its effect on both the 
nature and direction of the U.S. – ROK defence strategy will also be examined. The 
U.S. has recently confirmed its ten year defence plan and in it has strongly indicated 
that the Asia-Pacific will be its major focus because of the importance of the region 
to its future strategic goals. Coupled with the operational command handover jointly 
managed with South Korea, the USFK has evolved as required to maintain its 
feasibility. The rise of China as a major power in the region along with its continuing 
support of North Korea during an unstable period for them will be analysed in light of 
the impact it has on the USFK. The death of Kim Jong-Il and its impact on North 
Korean foreign and nuclear policy will also be discussed, to examine its effect on the 
region and the U.S. – ROK defence posture.  
To conclude, the paper will propose that because of these regional considerations, 
the long-term strategic plan of the U.S. – ROK alliance, and the uncertainty 
surrounding North Korea’s transitional period, the USFK remains a feasible and 
integral part of the future.   
Overview of U.S. – Korean Security Relations 
The U.S. has had a presence in Korea since World War Two, after the Japanese 
surrender and subsequent annexing of Korea. The country was split along the 38th 
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Parallel, with the Soviet Union remaining North and the U.S. South. With Korea 
being split along political lines, a series of skirmishes along the parallel eventually 
lead to a surprise large scale attack by the communist Northern forces. This led to 
the beginning of the Korean War, which lasted from 1950 – 1953. Since the signing 
of the armistice in 1953 signalled a cease-fire to the Korean War, the communist 
North Korea and capitalist South Korea have had a fraught relationship marked by 
frequent diplomatic and military clashes. The USFK maintained its presence after the 
signing of the armistice, when the two Korea’s were split by the Demilitarized Zone 
(DMZ). In the year of the armistice signing the US initiated a bilateral security treaty, 
which in reality was a unilateral defence guarantee that established a permanent 
troop presence in the South. Since then, the North’s default posture has been to 
maintain an aggressive stance against the US-ROK alliance. However after the 
downing of an ROK plan in 1987, overt acts of war were abandoned in favour of 
diplomatic attacks.1   
 
When Lee Myung-Bak became the South Korean President in 2007, it represented a 
swing back of public support towards conservative foreign policy. This brought with it 
a harder stance towards North Korea and a stronger pro-U.S. stance than the two 
previous progressive Presidents, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Mu-Hyun.2 The stronger 
U.S.-ROK alliance meant greater economic and defence cooperation, with a review 
of the U.S. military presence in the ROK resulting in the status quo being maintained. 
The introduction of the MB Policy negatively affected inter-Korean relations, with the 
North growing more hostile in its dealings with President Lee’s government, and 
outspoken in its criticism of the ROK being a ‘puppet’ of the US.3 This came to a 
head in 2010, with the sinking of a Korean Naval Ship and the shelling of 
Yeonpyeong Island.  
 
The South Korean Naval Corvette Cheonan sank in the Yellow Sea on the West 
Coast of Korea in March 2010 killing 46 sailors. The UN Security Council tasked a 
South Korean led Joint Investigation Group (JIG) to investigate the circumstances 
                                                          
1
 Bandow, D. (2010). ‘The U.S. – South Korea Alliance: Outdated, Unnecessary, and Dangerous, Washington: 
The Cato Institute, p.2.  
2
 Snyder, S. (2009). ‘Lee Myung-Bak’s Foreign Policy’, The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, 21(1), p.93.   
3
 Klingner, B. (2008). New South Korean President Brings Conservative Policy Change. Washington: The 
Heritage Foundation, p.4. 
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surrounding the sinking. The JIG presented a summary of their investigation and 
concluded that the Cheonan had been sunk by a torpedo fired by a North Korean 
submarine. Although condemned by the UN and the majority of the international 
community, North Korea denied any involvement in the sinking. As a result, South 
Korea suspended all trade and diplomatic discourse until the North admitted its role 
in the sinking and offered a full apology. The North responded by stating that “if the 
South puppet group comes out with 'response' and 'retaliation', we will respond 
strongly with ruthless punishment including the total shutdown of North-South ties, 
abrogation of the North-South agreement on non-aggression and abolition of all 
North-South cooperation projects.”4  
 
Although there was a constant war of words being engaged between the two nations 
following the Cheonan sinking, the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on the 23rd of 
November 2010 by North Korean artillery was as devastating as it was unexpected. 
The bombardment consisting of 170 artillery shells followed a South Korean military 
exercise in the area, causing widespread damage on the island. Four South Koreans 
were killed and a further 19 were injured. Unlike the Cheonan incident, the North 
admitted it had fired the artillery shells but said that they were merely retaliating to 
the ROK conducting military exercises in their territorial waters. The U.S. stood by its 
long-term ally and condemned the bombardment. As a show of alliance solidarity 
large-scale joint military exercises were conducted, with the added effect of 
demonstrating to the rest of the region the ability of U.S.-ROK military forces to surge 
on the Korean Peninsula. As a result of Lee Myung-Bak’s MB Policy, this further 
consolidated an alliance that had been at its strongest since the days of military rule 
in Korea.5 The North predictably spoke out against the exercises, labelling them an 
act of aggression. As expected, China kept its neutral stance and called for calm, 
stressing the need for a return to the six-party talks and further diplomacy.  
What had started out as a flashpoint in inter-Korea relations had become a focal 
point for security issues causing tension in the region, which involved the UN 
Security Council and competing US and Chinese interests. The incidents served to  
                                                          
4
 Kim, M. (Friday 21
st
 May 2010). North Korea Declares Phase of War with South, Reuters.  
5
 Snyder, S. and Byun, S. (2011). ‘Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to North Korea’s 
Provocations’, The Rusi Journal, 156(2), p.75. 
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highlight the need for greater regional diplomacy in light of the failed six-party talks, 
which were mediated by China and aimed at discussing issues such as 
denuclearisation and security. U.S. and Chinese reactions to Cheonan and 
Yeonpyeong provided a litmus test of the two nation’s leadership in regional security 
issues, as well as demonstrating how the strengthening U.S. – ROK alliance conflicts 
with China’s desire to expand its influence on regional security on the back of their 
rapid economic growth.6 With an obvious difference in strategic planning between 
China and the U.S. exposed by Cheonan and Yeonpyeong, both nations’ 
management approach to the Korean peninsula came under scrutiny. As a result of 
this strategic introspection, the issue of the U.S. military presence in the ROK came 
to the fore in Washington as well as the major East-Asian nations.      
Anti-Americanism and the Effects of Korean Popular Opinion 
The US – ROK alliance has been a solid basis for security on the Korean Peninsula 
since the signing of the armistice in 1953. Although there have been a number of 
incidents between the two Koreas, the alliance and its associated U.S. military 
presence in South Korea has served as an effective deterrent against another full 
scale inter-Korean war.7 ROK governments have demonstrated unwavering and 
universal support for the alliance, with the authoritarian military rule in particular 
doing everything in its power to maintain strong ties with Washington. In contrast 
public sentiment on the alliance has fluctuated, with the rise of an anti-American 
movement coinciding with the pro-democracy student protests of the 1970s and 80s. 
Prior to this period of democratic reform, the strong public support for the alliance 
was attributed to the gratitude of those who has experienced and suffered through 
the Korean War by many political analysts. Professor Young-Shik Lee of Hannam 
University observed that “America was viewed as the saviour country, that saved 
Korea…Korea was very grateful, especially after the Korean War for receiving 
significant economic aid.”8 As a result, that generation of South Korean’s remained 
loyal to and supportive of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) in their country.       
                                                          
6
 Snyder, S. and Byun, S. (2011). ‘Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to North Korea’s 
Provocations’, The Rusi Journal, 156(2), p.75. 
7
 Stevens, W. (2006). Is U.S. Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?, Strategy Research Project, U.S 
Army War College, p.1.  
8
 Evans, L. (2003). International Institute, The Rise of Anti-Americanism in South Korea, Los Angeles, UCLA. 
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The lasting effects of loyalty and gratitude from the Korean War generation and the 
rapid economic growth achieved by the U.S. backed authoritarian government, 
meant that the U.S. – ROK alliance was considered an essential element of South 
Korean development. As stated by Nae-Young Lee, the alliance “served as an 
effective security framework to deter North Korean aggression. In addition, it has 
helped to create a stable environment for economic dynamism and democratic 
consolidation within South Korea.”9 This stability lasted until the U.S. backed 
authoritarian system of leadership underwent democratic transition as a result of 
mass protests in the 1980s. The popular opinion in Korea during this period was that 
the U.S. was propping up the military government to serve its own interest. As anti-
American sentiment grew, the U.S. managed to retain support amongst the Korean 
people by not actively interfering with the transition to democracy while remaining a 
firm ally. This maintained the solidarity of the alliance throughout the late 20th century 
and allowed the USFK to remain in an operational capacity during the transition to 
democracy.   
Even with the USFK remaining, the U.S. noted that the protests demonstrated how 
the people’s voice in South Korea had the ability to instigate reform. As democracy 
flourished in South Korea, the U.S. – ROK alliance remained steady while many 
political firsts for the nation occurred. Kim Young-Sam, the first non-military president 
was democratically elected and Kim Dae-Jung became the first leader of the 
opposition to be elected president. The inauguration of Kim Dae-Jung also marked a 
significant shift in political ideology, with the progressive former political activist and 
prisoner departing from the conservative background of previous administrations. His 
election demonstrated a shift in public opinion towards a more liberal view on both 
the economy and foreign policy. Since the forced democratisation of South Korea, 
the nation’s leadership could not take public opinion lightly as they realised the 
greater influence and voice of the people. Amidst strong public support, Kim’s 
‘Sunshine Policy’ proposed greater engagement with the North, while re-addressing 
the nation’s relationship with its traditional ally the U.S. On a wave of progressive 
popular support, the role and necessity of the USFK began to be questioned.   
                                                          
9
 Lee, N. (2005). Changing South Korean Public Opinion on the US and the ROK – US Alliance, Korea University: 
Department of Political Science, Workshop Paper 05/05, p.2.   
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The election of Roh Moo-Hyun was seen as a sign of the South Korean public’s 
approval of Kim Dae-Jung and his Sunshine Policy. Roh was a former member of 
Kim’s cabinet who pledged to continue to uphold the principles and intent of the 
Sunshine Policy through his own ‘Peace and Prosperity Policy.’ Public opinion on the 
U.S. – ROK alliance had fluctuated during Kim’s presidency with surveys showing 
that a majority supported greater engagement with North Korea, but at the same 
time believed that U.S. – ROK ties needed to remain strong. However, the U.S. had 
become uneasy at Roh’s stance on issues such as unconditional aid and 
engagement with North Korea, allied with a reduction in joint military exercises and 
defence discourse. Washington remained wary of the North’s intentions and was 
vocal in its criticism of what it saw as Roh’s divergence from what had been 
discussed in joint talks, effectively undermining U.S. strategy towards North Korea.10 
This was exacerbated by the fact that while inter-Korean relations were steadily 
improving, the North had taken an increasingly belligerent stance towards the U.S. – 
ROK alliance. This created a dilemma for Seoul and once again raised questions 
regarding the future of the USFK.      
An unintended side-effect of the Sunshine Policy and the subsequent improvement 
in inter-Korean relations was its effect on public support for the U.S. – ROK alliance. 
Beginning with the first inter-Korea summit between Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jung-Il 
in 2000, the South Korean public perceived the hard-line stance of George Bush’s 
North Korea Policy as detrimental to the possibility of Korean reunification. Roh 
stated that “for the existence and prosperity of the nation, then sunshine policy is 
absolutely necessary, and thus must be carried on.”11 Although the new 
administration had gained popularity with the South Korean public by vowing to 
continue the progress made in inter-Korean relations, the fact that the U.S. opposed 
the continuation of unconditional engagement with the North promoted by the 
Sunshine Policy led to further diplomatic tensions. To gain further traction with the 
younger voters who were the main supporters of the anti-American movement, Roh 
openly criticised the U.S.’ attempts to influence Korean policy.  
                                                          
10
 Kim, C. (2005). The Roh Moo-Hyun Government’s Policy Toward North Korea, East-West Center, Working 
Paper 08/11, p.11. 
11
 Ibid, p.11. 
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The rise in anti-American sentiment rose from the public’s resentment against the 
overt U.S. influence in Korean foreign policy, a desire to have a more ‘equal’ 
partnership, and a high profile incident where two schoolgirls were accidently killed 
by a U.S. armoured vehicle during a training exercise in Gwangjeok. Although the 
U.S. military made a formal apology to the families of the two victims, the incident 
served to inflame an already combustible atmosphere. Roh himself did little to 
dissuade the anti-American sentiment, provoking outrage when he went as far as to 
state that he “might favour neutrality if a war ever broke out between North Korea 
and the United States.”12 As a result of the growing tide of negativity towards the 
U.S., regular USFK joint military exercises were put on hold. Washington began to 
question whether the benefits outweighed the costs of pooling a large portion of 
defence resources in a country seemingly intent on downgrading a long-term 
alliance.   
Although the political stage was where the friction was being played out, 
domestically the South Korean public were demonstrating their antagonism by 
holding anti-American protests and barring U.S. military personnel from certain 
areas. For the first time since the pro-democracy protests during the 1980s, the U.S 
– ROK alliance seemed to be weakening with the leaders of both countries refusing 
to budge on their respective positions regarding North Korea. The future of the USFK 
looked as unsteady as it had ever been, and the influence the people of South Korea 
had on the alliance was demonstrated again.     
As the U.S. – ROK alliance began to weaken during Roh’s presidency, political 
observers such as Doug Bandow of the Cato Institute believed that the “U.S. had no 
vital interests in Korea that justify huge costs and sacrifice” and that with the further 
rise in anti-American sentiment amongst the population “the two nations need to 
prepare for divorce.”13 With political pressure mounting in the U.S. against the USFK 
presence in the ROK because of Washington’s continuing military commitment to the 
Iraq campaign, the anti-American sentiment from both President Roh and the Korean  
                                                          
12
 Levin, N. (2004). Do the Ties Still Bind?: The U.S. – ROK Security Relationship after 9/11, California: Rand, 
p.21.    
13
 Bandow, D. (2005). The Future of the U.S. – ROK Alliance: Equality, Mutuality, and International Security, 
Korean Association of International Studies Conference, Conference Paper, Seoul, Republic of Korea 24 – 25 
March 2005, p.12.  
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public provided further ammunition for those who believed the USFK was no longer 
feasible. The U.S. response to Roh’s threat to weaken ties with Washington and 
maintain a neutral position between the U.S. and China on regional issues, was to 
cut 100 jobs of South Koreans working at U.S. military bases and withdraw key 
combat equipment. The official reason given was that these measures were 
implemented because of “reduced financial support from South Korea.”14 However 
the U.S. was clearly demonstrating that it would not tolerate the undermining of their 
contribution to ROK security.      
However a major turning point in inter-Korean relations occurred when North Korea 
withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003, amidst 
reports that it had used financial aid received on humanitarian grounds to fund its 
nuclear programme.15 Even with this renewed security threat from the North, Roh 
vowed to continue making inter-Korean reconciliation his top priority. In the past it 
had been a trend for the South Korean public’s attitude towards the U.S. - ROK 
alliance to become positive when an external threat to national security arose.16 The 
North Korean nuclear crisis proved the validity of this trend. A 2002 survey showed 
that 39% of South Koreans believed the U.S. was its biggest security threat 
compared to 33% for North Korea.17 This is in stark contrast to a similar survey in 
2005 after the nuclear crisis arose, where 88% believed that North Korea was the 
biggest threat to security. Another question in the 2005 survey showed that 36% of 
South Koreans wanted a stronger defence alliance with the U.S. compared to 20% of 
respondents in the 2002 survey.18 With concern over the nuclear threat shifting 
support back towards the U.S. – ROK defence relationship, the USFK once again 
became a symbol of solidarity and security.  
It could be seen that during the Peace and Prosperity period, the reason for friction  
                                                          
14
 Lee, N. (2005). Changing South Korean Public Opinion on the US and the ROK – US Alliance, Korea University: 
Department of Political Science, Workshop Paper 05/05, p.2.  
15
 Kim, C. (2005). The Roh Moo-Hyun Government’s Policy Toward North Korea, East-West Center, Working 
Paper 08/11, p.13. 
16
 Lee, N. (2005). Changing South Korean Public Opinion on the US and the ROK – US Alliance, Korea University: 
Department of Political Science, Workshop Paper 05/05, p.3.  
17
 Kim, C. (2005). The Roh Moo-Hyun Government’s Policy Toward North Korea, East-West Center, Working 
Paper 08/11, p.16. 
18
 Lee, N. (2005). Changing South Korean Public Opinion on the US and the ROK – US Alliance, Korea University: 
Department of Political Science, Workshop Paper 05/05, p.4.  
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within the U.S. – ROK alliance was the “diverging perception and policy stance of the 
two governments toward North Korea. Considering the fact that the South Korean 
public shows their support for the U.S. – ROK alliance to deter North Korean threats, 
the policy stance of the Roh government does not seem to adequately represent the 
policy preferences of the Korean public.”19 This divergence in leadership direction did 
not always correspond with public opinion on North Korea or the U.S. – ROK 
alliance. With the increased threat to national security in the form of a nuclear 
capable North, the South Korean public became increasingly supportive of the USFK 
and its ability to act as a threat deterrence. It was the ability of the USFK to provide 
security on the Korean Peninsula that cemented the legitimacy of the alliance in the 
minds of the South Korean public. This paved the way for critics of both the 
Sunshine and Peace and Prosperity policies, to campaign for a change in foreign 
policy during the 2007 presidential election.    
As it transpired, the conservative Grand National Party (GNP) returned to power in a 
landslide victory. Lee Myung-Bak had correctly gauged the rising tide of public 
opinion against the perceived incompetence of Roh’s government as well as the 
belief that the Peace and Prosperity Policy was not providing the security and 
deterrence against the nuclear threat of North Korea. Lee could see that there was a 
wave of negative public opinion surrounding the principles of the Sunshine Policy. 
He quickly took advantage of the opinion swing back towards a conservative foreign 
policy, stating his intention to take a hard-line approach towards the North’s nuclear 
ambitions and to improve ties with the US that had been damaged during Roh’s 
tenure. Public opinion polls conducted during the lead up to the 2007 presidential 
election demonstrated that the majority of the South Korean public favoured a return 
to a hard-line stance. They believed sanctions against the North were a necessary 
measure forced by the North’s refusal to adhere to the region’s nuclear non-
proliferation treaty. A key part of this conservative policy was to maintain the combat 
power of the USFK.   
The caveat to this support was the fear that imposing such sanctions would provoke 
the North into further military aggression. As a result, the public believed the U.S. – 
                                                          
19
 Lee, N. (2005). Changing South Korean Public Opinion on the US and the ROK – US Alliance, Korea University: 
Department of Political Science, Workshop Paper 05/05, p.15.  
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ROK alliance was as important as ever because of the security and deterrence factor 
the USFK presence on the peninsula provided. Anti-American sentiment dropped 
dramatically with the return of the conservative GNP under Lee Myung-Bak, whose 
election campaign centred on strengthening the U.S. – ROK alliance in the wake of 
North Korea’s developing nuclear capabilities. The landslide win in the 2008 
presidential election demonstrated the public support for Lee’s MB Policy and his 
plans to strengthen U.S. - ROK relations, introduce a hard-line foreign policy and 
impose sanctions on the North in response to their nuclear non-proliferation 
refusal.20 The U.S. was supportive of the MB Policy, and the damage to the U.S. – 
ROK alliance caused by policy disagreements during the sunshine era began to 
mend.                                                                                           
The positive trajectory that the U.S. – ROK alliance followed after Lee’s inauguration 
and the launch of his MB Policy, continued with the drafting of the KORUS FTA and 
talks to increase the frequency of joint military training on the Korean Peninsula.21 
Although economic analysts forecast the positive effects the KORUS FTA would 
have on domestic economic activity and a greater demand for South Korean made 
exports goods, the decision to end a ban on U.S. beef exports was a key aspect of 
the FTA that caused a national outcry. While the negative reaction of the North in 
response to the hard-line MB Policy led to security concerns and a renewed public 
support for the U.S. military presence in Korea, the beef export agreement led to 
renewed anti-Americanism. The Korean media coverage centred on the poor quality 
of U.S. beef that was reflected in its cheaper price, as well as the negative effect it 
would have on the Korean beef industry. Large scale public demonstrations against 
the agreement had the desired result, as both countries administrations revised the 
agreement in June 2008 to limit sales of U.S. beef to cattle less than 30 months 
old.22 Public demonstrations began to wane and more significantly demonstrated 
how influential public opinion had become in terms of the U.S. – ROK alliance and 
the continued presence of the USFK.   
                                                          
20
 Kwon, H. (2010). ‘Economic Perceptions and Electoral Choice in South Korea: The Case of the 2007 
Presidential Election’, The Pacific Review, 23(2), p.6. 
21
 Han, S. (2011). The State of the U.S. – ROK Alliance, Korea Programme Essay, Council on Foreign Relations 
Press, p.1.  
22
 Niksch, L. (2010). Korea – U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for 
Congress, 01/10, p.15.  
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The Evolution of the U.S. – ROK Military Alliance   
From the beginning of the 21st century, the U.S. military alliance with South Korea 
has remained steady, even with fluctuating domestic politics and attitudes towards 
North Korea. When evaluating the future of this military alliance, the U.S. identified 
five issues that have the potential to alter the alliance structure and the overall U.S. 
military presence in South Korea. They are; the relocation of U.S. troops in South 
Korea to strategic areas of the Korean peninsula, changing the command structure 
from the current joint forces command to an independent co-operative command, the 
reduction of U.S. ground forces in South Korea, a greater South Korean contribution 
to U.S. led overseas operations, and a host nation contribution to the cost of 
maintaining a U.S. garrison in South Korea. These issues arose from a number of 
factors both strategic and political. They included the deterioration of conventional 
North Korean land forces as resources were pulled towards nuclear development 
and advanced weaponry, the anti-U.S. military protests that followed the launch of 
the Sunshine Policy, and U.S. military commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan.23  
The military alliance between the U.S. and ROK had suffered more than the 
economic relationship, during the two progressive presidential terms of Kim Dae-
Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun. Kim introduced the ground-breaking Sunshine Policy 
which advocated unconditional engagement with the North, with the ultimate goal of 
peaceful reunification. Roh’s Peace and Prosperity Policy was a continuation of the 
Sunshine Policy’s strategy towards the North and a domestic refocus on economic 
growth rather than military capability. Although continuing to push for stronger 
diplomatic ties with Seoul, this new policy direction was a concern for Washington 
with open criticism from Roh in particular threatening the future of the USFK. The 
U.S. believed that the unconditional engagement was allowing the North to receive 
the benefits of economic assistance without offering any compromise in return. 
These fears were realised when it was discovered that the North has reneged on the 
terms of an East Asian Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by developing a nuclear 
weapons development programme.24 At a time when the U.S. – ROK military alliance 
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was needed to neutralise a new security threat from the North, policy disagreements 
and U.S. military commitments to the Middle East meant that the reduction of USFK 
personnel and their role in South Korea seemed probable.   
The 2004 programme to reduce the number of U.S. troops in South Korea aimed to 
withdraw approximately 10,000 troops and redistribute the remaining forces to hub 
bases such as Pyeongtaek. This was in line with strategic estimates that the 
likelihood of a ground force invasion through the DMZ was unlikely. The impact of 
the withdrawal of U.S. troops at such a vulnerable time was reflected in the opinions 
of the Korean public who began to turn against the policies of the Sunshine Policy 
and support the U.S. – ROK alliance in greater numbers.25 Although the friction 
remained between Washington and the progressive South Korean government, 
President Bush accepted Roh’s proposal to change the command structure of the 
joint U.S. – ROK armed forces from the Combined Forces Command (CFC) it had 
been since the armistice to a separate forces command structure. The structure 
changeover was scheduled for 2012 and signalled the first major defence agreement 
since the advent of the Sunshine Policy. However with the on-going threat of the 
North’s nuclear ambitions and the South Korean public’s backlash against the 
progressives, the return of the conservative GNP created a period of domestic 
transition that initiated a reassessment of the defence alliance and the role of the 
USFK. 
Lee Myung-Bak’s MB Policy, returned to the conservative principles that had 
dominated policy decision-making during the presidency of Park Chung-Hee. 
However the level of adherence was much less severe than the absolute anti-North 
Korean attitude prevalent at the time. Even with the MB Policy pushing for a closer 
alliance with the U.S and a hard-line stance towards the North, engagement was 
encouraged as long as there was compromise on key issues such as nuclear non-
proliferation.26 The U.S. welcomed the return of a conservative government as the 
foreign policy was more in line with its own strategy on North Korea and Asia as a 
whole. As the two partners’ policy vision merged once more, joint future planning for  
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the USFK began to progress. Even with the alliance becoming stronger than it had 
been during the consecutive progressive governments, decisions on the force 
command structure and reduction of U.S. forces was postponed in light of the 
nuclear security threat from the North and the requirement for more troops in 
Afghanistan.  
The withdrawal plan had originally looked to reduce U.S. troop level from 37,000 to 
25,000 by the end of 2008, with 3,600 man brigade sent to Iraq as part of the first 
stage of reductions.27 However during talks with Washington, Lee requested that any 
further reductions be delayed until a clear joint defence strategy was developed and 
implemented. With the U.S. – ROK alliance at its highest point since South Korean 
democratisation, Washington agreed to delay the reduction but in return expected a 
greater contribution to the alliance from the ROK. Although the delay in making a 
decision appeared to place the future of the USFK in limbo, the joint defence 
planning showed that the USFK remained a key element of the alliance’s strategy.        
President Obama visited South Korea in 2009 to discuss the U.S. – ROK defence 
relationship, the North Korea conundrum, and the KORUS FTA. Along with 
cementing the date of the operational command transfer from 2012 to 2015, Obama 
requested a South Korean ground troop contribution to Afghanistan.28 In response to 
the firm commitment by Obama to continue the strong U.S. – ROK defence alliance, 
the South Korean government announced that they would forward for approval to the 
National Assembly, plans to send a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) of 
approximately 300 troops to Afghanistan.29 This PRT would be located north of 
Kabul and be under the command of the U.S. led International Security Assistance 
Force Headquarters.  
In addition to the agreement to send troops to Afghanistan, the South Korean 
government also pledged to increase their direct financial contribution for the 
maintenance of U.S. forces to 42% of the total cost (US$571 million).30 This would 
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increase by 4% each year until it reached the 50% threshold requested by 
Washington.31 By making a commitment to reciprocate their defence interests, the 
alliance partners had effectively guaranteed their commitment to the USFK. Both of 
these major agreements signalled the dedication of both nations to strengthen the 
U.S. – ROK alliance and maintain a strong U.S. defence presence in South Korea.  
The New U.S. Defence Strategic Plan and its Effect on the USFK     
In early 2012, President Obama briefed the Department of Defence on his ten year 
defence strategic plan. The plan along with an evaluation of the global security 
situation was compiled in a presidential report titled ‘Sustaining Global Leadership: 
Priorities for 21st Century Defence.’ The plan was a combined effort involving close 
consultation between the President, security advisors, and the various service chiefs. 
The report proposed a new structure and role for the U.S. military over the next 
decade in light of the projected global security climate. With this is mind, the report 
outlines the aims to create a military that is “smaller and leaner, but agile, flexible, 
ready, and technologically advanced.”32 Along with the global security climate, the 
other major factor considered when creating the ten year plan was the global 
economic downturn and its enforced fiscal austerity. As a result, “the U.S. defence 
budget will be cut by $487 billion and the sizes of the Army and Marine Corps will 
shrink by 80,000 and 14,000 respectively over the next ten years.33  
The dramatic spending and force reductions have been met with concern and 
criticism from various groups in congress on both ends of the political spectrum. The 
conservative faction of the Republican Party was concerned about how the reduced 
defence spending and size would affect domestic security. On the other hand, liberal 
elements in congress supported even greater cuts to spending and personnel. The 
withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan meant that defence budget cuts could be 
justified and funnelled towards domestic issues such as the health system.34 The  
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differing opinions of domestic politics in the U.S. were also reflected in the reaction of 
South Korean interest groups. Supporters of the reduction or withdrawal of U.S. 
troops saw the ten year plan as a sign that the USFK would reduce in number as 
Washington abandons “outdated Cold war-era systems of large conventional ground 
forces, no longer sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”35 
Supporters of the continuing U.S. – ROK defence relationship in the form of the 
USFK considered the report with trepidation, fearing a USFK downsize would 
compromise security during a period of upheaval on the Korean Peninsula.  
The South Korean media began to focus on what it believed were the four issues the 
ten year plan would create for security policy-makers if implemented. The first of 
these issues was how the potential reduction in USFK troops would affect the 
security situation in Korea. The second was closely linked to the reduction of USFK 
troops, as it centred on how the surge plan for USFK forces in the event of a North 
Korean invasion would work with a smaller force. The third issue looked at how the 
USFK would need to be structured to enable strategic flexibility in light of the report’s 
plan to make U.S. forces smaller but more agile, flexible, and quickly deployable.36 
The last issue was how the plan’s proposed budget cuts on U.S. defence spending 
would affect South Korea’s defence budget in light of Washington’s demand for 
financial burden sharing when it came to sustaining the USFK. All of these issues 
caused concern because to the South Korean public it appeared that the U.S. 
commitment to the USFK was waning.      
While clarifying that the budget and troops cuts were inevitable following the scaling 
down of military operations in the Middle-East, the ten year plan stressed that U.S. 
strategic interests would shift to the Asia-Pacific in the near future. The rise of China 
and the growing importance of Asia in relation to the world economy behoved the 
U.S. to maintain a strong presence and involvement in the region. President Obama 
moved quickly to quash South Korean concerns on how the budget and troop cuts 
would flow on to the USFK. On a trip to Australia he announced plans to have a 
permanent U.S. Marine force stationed there, and stated that the U.S. “will be  
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strengthening our presence in the Asia-Pacific and budget reductions will not come 
at the expense of that critical region.”37 In support of the president’s statements, the 
Secretary of Defence added that the U.S. would “increase its institutional weight and 
focus on enhanced presence, power projection, and deterrence in the Asia-Pacific.”38 
These statements combined with the ten year plan, further demonstrated the U.S.’ 
commitment to a stronger U.S. – ROK alliance that had been confirmed during bi-
lateral talks in late 2011. No major reductions to the force level of the USFK were 
confirmed following meetings between high-ranking defence leaders. Therefore, the 
troop reductions would likely take place in Europe and the Middle-East rather than 
South Korea and Asia. The future strategic focus was now officially aimed towards 
the Asia-Pacific.  
The current operational plan for a USFK surge in the event of a North Korean 
invasion was established prior to the release of the ten year plan. The surge had a 
deployment window of 90 days to mass 690,000 ground troops, 160 naval 
destroyers with crew, and 2,000 combat aircraft.39 The feasibility of these numbers 
was questioned by critics once the War on Terror in Afghanistan massed military 
resources to the Middle-East. Even with the projected withdrawal of troops from 
Afghanistan, the planned reduction of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines has made 
these numbers impossible to achieve regardless of the timeframe. However, this has 
served to highlight the need for the USFK to maintain its combat strength in the face 
of U.S. military reductions as the region remains a high strategic priority. This may 
mean that the U.S. delays pulling out USFK troops in time for the South Korean 
military to maintain its steady growth in capability, so that the overall joint U.S. – 
ROK military force retains its combat power on the Korean Peninsula. This would 
require further joint strategic planning, as well as a firm commitment from 
Washington to maintain the USFK.     
It is a significant statement of support for the future of the USFK that they remain 
committed to remaining in South Korea without a drastic reduction in troop numbers,   
                                                          
37
 Kim, Y. (2012). The New Defence Strategic Guidance and its Implications for South Korean Security, EAI Issue 
Briefing, 01/12, p.2.  
38
 Ibid, p.2.  
39
 Klingner, B. (2012). ‘The Missing Asia Pivot in Obama’s Defence Strategy’, Memo 3443, Heritage Foundation, 
p.2.  
Page 22 of 63 
 
despite the streamlining of the defence force adopted by the ten year plan. As long 
as U.S. forces are stationed on the Korean Peninsula, then the U.S. government 
“cannot easily abandon its commitment to South Korean security because not only 
does the U.S. government cherish the effort and cost that it has already devoted to 
maintain the alliance for the past 60 years, but it would also have concerns about 
damage to other alliance relationships caused by withdrawing its commitment to 
South Korean security.”40 However with public support for large scale military 
intervention having waned in the U.S. since the Afghanistan campaign, the USFK 
presence remains largely a strategic deterrence force rather than one poised for 
direct combat intervention. However, this does not make it any less tactically 
effective. With Washington having now shifted its strategic focus on East-Asia, the 
traditionally strong U.S. – ROK alliance has provided a solid platform for the U.S. to 
remain influential in the region while “improving the ability of South Korea to defend 
and deter against North Korean aggression.”41    
The recurring theme of the ten year plan was that by downsizing the U.S. armed 
forces they would develop a more flexible and easily deployable force. This would be 
applicable to all U.S. forces stationed overseas. Increasing the strategic flexibility of 
the USFK however, raised two major security concerns with the South Korean 
government. The first was a practical concern that the frequent in and out of station 
movement to maintain force stability, would jeopardise the readiness and cohesion 
of the USFK. The second was the possibility that having a flexible US military 
presence as part of the USFK could lead to South Korean forces being drawn into an 
undesirable conflict. With the U.S. concentrating its military focus in the Asia-Pacific, 
the fear for Seoul is that any conflict in the Taiwan Strait would antagonise China 
and inadvertently draw the ROK into any power struggle between the U.S. and 
China.42       
Through robust bi-lateral strategic planning concerning the future of the USFK, the 
security concerns were addressed by recognising the negative side-effects of 
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downsizing without reason and reaching a compromise on force reduction.43 The 
excessive U.S. troop movement in and out of South Korea that was seen as 
unavoidable because of the operational commitment of U.S. troops in the Middle-
East could now be addressed. A longer posting duration and an improvement in 
USFK stationing and conditions of service, were identified by both militaries’ leaders 
as two critical adjustments that could promote deployment stability and reduce the 
personnel turnover. Money would be spent to improve the facilities of U.S. bases in 
South Korea in order to upgrade them as ‘forward station garrisons’ rather than 
‘rotationally deployed garrisons.44 The upgrade in facilities would be accompanied by 
a tour of duty normalisation, where a longer 36 month accompanied posting replaces 
the current 12 month unaccompanied model.  
To resolve the second concern Washington agreed to consider South Korean 
concerns when becoming involved in regional conflicts, particularly in the Taiwan 
Strait. Mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the flexibility of the USFK to 
serve U.S. strategic interests was balanced by South Korea’s primary concern over 
North Korean aggression and reluctance to antagonise China. The amount of effort 
put into planning to counter these concerns, demonstrated the importance placed on 
the USFK’s survivability by U.S. military command.  
With the U.S. government’s commitment to reducing defence spending while 
maintaining a strong presence in the Asia-Pacific, it is likely that Washington will 
demand more financial burden-sharing from its alliance partners. Although the ten 
year plan does not specifically outline this intent, annual talks between the U.S. – 
ROK alliance have highlighted the need to synchronise co-operation during the 
USFK’s transition. While the U.S. defence heads co-ordinate the handover of USFK 
operational command to South Korea by 2015 as well as realigning their forces in 
the region, it has requested that the South Korean government shoulders more of 
the financial burden of maintaining the USFK.  
The specifics of cost-sharing between the USFK alliance partners, is determined in a 
five-yearly planning cycle called the Special Measures Agreement (SMA). Under 
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most recent SMA in 2009 “South Korea has contributed directly about US$743 
million in 2011, which comprises about 42 percent of the total cost of maintaining the 
USFK. Pointing to South Korea’s advanced economic power, Washington continues 
to urge Seoul to increase its contribution.”45 The announcement of Obama’s ten year 
plan before a firm commitment to by Seoul to increase its contribution, means that 
the pressure on South Korea to increase its cost share is likely to increase.                     
The current defence expenditure of South Korea stands at 2.7% of its GDP and is 
one of only four out of the 27 other NATO member states to be over 2%.46 The two 
major ROK defence plans in place are the 2030 Defence Reformation Plan and the 
2015 Operational Command Transfer. Both plans heavily involve co-operation and 
co-ordination with the U.S., and both require incremental increases in South Korean 
defence expenditure. The current uncertainty over the region’s security climate as a 
result of North Korean leadership change and China’s rise, combined with the 
importance placed on a strong U.S. – ROK defence alliance by the South Korean 
public, means that such spending increases can be justified. Not only were the 
increases justified by the political climate, they were necessary to make a strong 
statement of support for the ten year plan and the USFK’s role within it.  
However with President Lee’s influence on the wane and the rise in popularity of the 
progressives who support a reduction in defence spending, it became “too 
burdensome both politically and fiscally for the South Korean government to pay a 
drastically increased larger cost sharing for the alliance.”47 With the U.S. – ROK 
alliance committed to moving forward with the USFK under a common strategic goal, 
and the political uncertainty of the upcoming South Korean presidential election, the 
decision on how to spread the financial burden would have to wait until the next 
SMA. To counteract this uncertainty, a major part of the GNP’s current campaign 
consisted of a clear message that it was time for South Korea to stand up and take a 
greater responsibility for its national security.    
The North Korean Influence on the USFK 
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Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy sought to create a new pathway towards peaceful 
re-unification with the North, by meeting belligerence with diplomacy and positive 
engagement. Roh Moo-Hyun continued down this path with his Peace and 
Prosperity Policy. Advances were made in mutual diplomacy such as the historic 
inter-Korea summit in 2000, and South Korea continued to provide economic aid and 
diplomatic concessions to maintain the cordial relationship with the North. Kim 
believed that his Sunshine policy would be able to “win North Korea’s trust with 
patience and generosity while ignoring the fundamental political dynamics on the 
Korean peninsula.”48  
The U.S. has expressed misgivings at this approach as it felt that the unconditional 
goodwill of the policy would allow the North to act without fear of reprisal. In spite of 
the diplomatic progress made on the back of the Sunshine Policy, the revelation that 
North Korea was developing a nuclear weapons programme, the continuing 
oppression of the North Korean population by its leadership, and the belligerent 
stance adopted by the North against the U.S. – ROK alliance meant that the U.S. 
fears were being realised. The initial optimism that had surrounded the Sunshine 
Policy was quickly replaced by the strong likelihood of failure.  
The North’s continuing defiance of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty meant that the 
U.S. policy towards Korea during the Clinton and Bush administrations concentrated 
on regional security and the repercussions of the North’s nuclear ambitions. 
Washington’s unease at the unconditional engagement approach of the Sunshine 
and Prosperity Policies meant that the U.S. – ROK alliance was weakened because 
of the difference in strategy regarding the North.49 The U.S. had always maintained a 
wary and outspoken stance against the North’s nuclear ambition and its proliferation 
of weapons. President Bush even went as far as including North Korea in the ‘axis of 
evil’ along with Iran and Iraq in his 2002 state of the union address. 
In contrast, South Korea was considered its strongest ally in the region in military 
terms. As a result, the USFK became more than a force. It became a symbol of 
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defensive solidarity. The relationship has always been a point of conflict between the 
Korea’s, with the North continually labelling the South a puppet of the U.S. and 
threatening to limit inter-Korea diplomacy unless the U.S. military’s influence and 
presence on the Korean peninsula is reduced.  
In 2003 because of growing concerns about North Korea’s withdrawal from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, six-party talks were initiated to find a peaceful 
resolution to this threat to regional security. These talks included North and South 
Korea, the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia. The talks encompassed a range of 
issues from the nuclear ambitions of North Korea, diplomatic relations between the 
states, and the U.S. military presence in South Korea.50 The first four rounds of talks 
yielded little progress as the supposedly allied member-states spent time pushing 
their own individualistic policy agenda towards North Korea.51  
This lack of co-operation was exacerbated by the conflicting agendas of China and 
the U.S., who apart from being traditional allies of the opposing Koreas were both 
jockeying for position in the race for regional influence. China in particular were loath 
to overtly criticise the North Korean nuclear stance even under pressure from the 
other member-states, as it believed forcing the North into a corner would threaten 
regional stability by provoking an unpredictable reaction. While the U.S. has adhered 
to its policy of imposing sanctions on North Korea to demonstrate that such 
belligerent behaviour would have negative repercussions, China looked to persevere 
with the six-party talks to preserve regional stability in order to protect its own 
economic growth.52  
A breakthrough seemed to have been reached by the fifth round of talks, when North 
Korea finally agreed to shut down its Yongbyun nuclear facility in exchange for 
emergency energy assistance and a relaxation of financial sanctions. On receipt of 
the first round of fuel assistance and a release of previously frozen North Korean 
banking accounts, the Yongbyun facility was shut down under the supervision of 
independent inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
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However in early 2009 under international pressure not to do so, North Korea 
proceeded with what it termed a satellite launch. The international pressure was a 
result of evidence that the satellite test was in fact a test of the ‘Taepyong-2,’ a long 
range ballistic missile.53 The U.S. and South Korea reacted to this breach by seeking 
United Nations (U.N.) sanctions against the North. The U.N. Security Council 
approved a resolution that restricted the financial transactions of North Korean 
institutions. North Korea reacted by refusing to take part in any six-party talks or be 
bound by any six-party agreements in the future unless such sanctions were relaxed. 
This was accompanied by a pledge to expel IAEA inspectors and continue its 
nuclear programme, unless the U.S. drastically reduced its military forces in South 
Korea and around the Korean peninsula.54    
Even with the unsettled regional environment caused by the breakdown of the six-
party talks and subsequent resumption of North Korea’s nuclear programme, the 
U.S. – ROK defence alliance continued to strengthen through a combination of joint 
strategic planning and reciprocation on common interests. Plans for large scale U.S. 
force reductions and relocations were put on hold, as the two allies looked to solidify 
in the face of North Korean belligerence. The plans to change the USFK command 
structure to allow South Korea greater operational control over its own forces 
continued to develop. Washington and Seoul released a joint forces vision statement 
that outlined the future plans for the alliance, with expansion onto the global stage 
and the transfer of USFK command high on the agenda.55 This strategy was 
manifested in a series of joint military exercises in the region, where the ROK 
defence headquarters assumed operational command with an eye towards the future 
transition. It seemed as if the increased threat from North Korea had highlighted the 
importance of the USFK, and brought the two partners closer together through 
adversity.  
In October 2009 somewhat surprisingly in light of the U.S. – ROK alliance’s 
increasing show of force and solidarity, Kim Jung-Il requested bilateral U.S. – North  
                                                          
53
 Wiseman, P. (2009). ‘World Powers Tense Over North Korean Missile Launch’, USA Today, 04 June.  
54
 Niksch, L. Niksch, L. (2010). Korea – U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS 
Report for Congress, 01/10, p.2. 
55
 Hwang, J. (2011). The Post-Crisis Era and Change in the Korea Peninsula’s Security Order, East Asia Institute, 
NSP Report 44.  
Page 28 of 63 
 
Korean talks to negotiate the end of U.N. sanctions. Washington agreed to the talks 
and sent an envoy to North Korea. The message from Washington was clear and 
had the full support of the South Korean government. In order to lift the sanctions 
North Korea must “resume participation in the six-party talks and a renewed 
commitment to the September 2005 six-party statement calling for denuclearisation 
of the Korean Peninsula.”56 The initial response from North Korea was positive 
although the envoy report indicated that the North was more interested in bi-lateral 
talks with the U.S. rather than returning to six-party talks. They were seeking “to 
draw the U.S. into negotiation of a bilateral peace treaty, move the nuclear issue into 
a bilateral peace treaty negotiation (ending the six-party talks), negotiate with the 
United States over elimination of the ‘U.S. nuclear threat’ (in effect a reduction of 
U.S. forces in Korea) and demand an early elimination of U.N. and U.S. sanctions 
against North Korea.”57            
The negotiations appeared to signal a fresh start in the relationship between the U.S. 
– ROK alliance and North Korea. This was reflected by the lack of military 
provocation from North Korea during 2009, where land incursions into the 
demilitarised zone (which had occurred regularly during the 1990s and 2000s) were 
non-existent following the bilateral negotiations. However the sense of optimism was 
tempered by the North’s official withdrawal in 2003 from the nuclear non-proliferation 
treaty it had ratified in 1985.58 These fears were confirmed on the 26th of March 
2010, when a South Korean naval corvette Cheonan was sunk in waters near the 
Northern limit line. Although the North immediately denied responsibility for the 
sinking, an independent U.N. investigation found that the damage to the hull that 
caused the corvette to sink was inflicted by a shockwave likely to be from a North 
Korean submarine torpedo.59 As the tension and accusations flew following the U.N. 
findings, North Korea conducted an artillery shelling of the South Korean territory 
Yeonpyeong Island. The North justified this barrage as self-defence, an inevitable 
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retaliation for what it perceived as aggressive South Korean military manoeuvres 
close to North Korean waters.  
These two incidents were considered significant flashpoints within the spectrum of 
inter-Korean relations, as they had significant security ramifications that extended 
beyond the Korean peninsula.60 The shifting power dynamics of the region, the rise 
of China, uncertainty over North Korean leadership, and a shift in South Korean 
foreign policy all contributed to the increasing significance of inter-Korean conflict 
and the subsequent response of East-Asian stakeholders. The period also marked a 
sudden escalation of inter-Korean tension after almost a decade of relative cordiality 
that accompanied the two progressive governments of Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-
Hyun. This raised the question of whether the shift in foreign policy to a hard-line 
North Korean and pro-U.S. stance that was initiated by Lee Myung-Bak’s 
conservative GNP, had contributed to the escalation of tension.  
The Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents and the key stakeholders’ response to 
them “established a direct linkage between inter-Korean tensions and the broader 
regional environment, placing a spotlight on the quality of Sino-U.S. relations and 
regional crisis management capabilities.”61 Although U.S. – ROK discussions 
regarding the future of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula had always taken 
regional factors into consideration, the events of Cheonan and Yeonpyeong 
demonstrated how the unpredictability of the North and the changing dynamics of 
East Asian relations, was forcing a review of the feasibility of U.S. forces in Korea. 
The response of China to these incidents and the North’s claims that it was merely 
retaliating to South Korean security threats, served to demonstrate the motives of 
Chinese policy on Korean issues and its reluctance to condemn actions by North 
Korea for the sake of regional stability. Throughout this crisis, people in South Korea 
remained relatively calm, believing in the abilities of the USFK to deter any further 
escalation. Many also believed that the incidents were pre-meditated by the North to 
show that it still had the conviction to strike if it felt justified.      
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The Defence Reformation Plan 307 was launched in 2010 as a direct response to 
the increased North Korean aggression that culminated in the Cheonan and 
Yeonpyeong incidents. The plan was drafted in consultation with key USFK leaders 
and used the new U.S. inspired model of force flexibility. It looked at enhancing 
collaboration among the four branches of the ROK defence force in addition to 
improving synchronisation with the U.S. force component of the USFK. This 
approach “calls for a more flexible posture to respond to future attacks, as opposed 
to the ‘total war’ scenario that has driven much of Seoul’s defence planning in the 
past.”62 The future of the USFK is more secure with a common strategic direction 
agreed upon by both alliance partners. It is the renewed stability and purpose of the 
USFK that has led to the previously reticent National Assembly approving a 6.2% 
increase in defence budget for 2011.63 By sparking a security conundrum on the 
Korean Peninsula through a series of military attacks, North Korea has inadvertently 
made an already strong U.S. – ROK defence alliance even stronger and more united 
in its vision for the future.                 
The Effect of Kim Jong-Il’s Death 
The death of Kim Jong-Il in late 2011 following 17 years of autocratic rule in North 
Korea created a wave of uncertainty on the Korean peninsula, raising questions 
about the effect it would have on the region and its stakeholders. After a long 
mourning period and speculation regarding the leadership, Kim Jong-Il’s son Kim 
Jung-Un was announced as his successor. Once the announcement was made, 
President Lee immediately stated that the inter-Korean relationship was at a 
crossroads, with an opportunity to move forward positively. However in line with his 
stance since his inauguration, he placed a caveat on the prospect of relations 
improving by stating that North Korean sincerity was essential for the two Koreas to 
work together to open a new era.”64 Lee was unwavering in his support of the stance 
the U.S. – ROK alliance had adopted, with the North Korean nuclear programme 
being the only barrier to resuming talks. Diplomacy and aid remained the incentives 
offered to the North, with Lee stating that South Korea is “ready to resolve security  
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concerns on the Korean peninsula and provide assistance to revive North Korea’s 
economy through agreements in the six-nation talks.”65 However, national security 
would not be compromised with the USFK ready and willing to counter any 
provocation by the North.  
These comments proved that even after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, 
the death of Kim Jong-Il has fortified optimism that inter-Korean relations can 
improve. While this optimism may remain, statements regarding defence have also 
demonstrated that both Seoul and Washington remain wary as to the intentions of 
the new leadership in North Korea so will look to maintain the ready state of the 
USFK.66 However, North Korea has maintained frosty relations with the U.S. – ROK 
alliance since Lee’s conservative government took charge and the U.N. imposed 
sanctions on them as a result of its nuclear activities. Lee’s failure to send a 
condolence delegation to pay their respects to Kim Jong-Il seem to rally the North 
Korean media against the South Korean government once again, with threats of 
revenge and retribution aimed at the ROK. They have also urged the North Korean 
people to get behind the new leader Kim Jung-Un, partially assuaging fears that 
China, the U.S. and South Korea had of a leadership battle that could have severely 
de-stabilised the country. It is this instability in North Korea and the possible 
consequences that has made the consolidation of the USFK after its planned 
modification so important.  
Predicting how the new leader of North Korea would approach inter-Korean relations 
was always going to be a challenge, with the North’s unpredictability being proven on 
numerous occasions. Even with the antagonism from the North towards South Korea 
since Lee Myung-Bak’s conservatives returned to government and took a hard-line 
stance on inter-Korean relations, not many observers predicted the events of 2010. 
The Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong Island shelling had followed a relatively calm 
period on the Korean peninsula following the launch of the Sunshine Policy, with 
antagonism more likely to be manifested in political speeches and diplomatic 
conflict.67 The two acts of war showed that North Korea’s biggest danger apart from 
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its nuclear ambitions was its unpredictability. They justified both acts by citing self-
defence, with U.S. – ROK naval manoeuvres off the Korean coast regarded as a 
security threat. However, such USFK exercises were a regular occurrence raising 
the question of whether the incidents were used to gain leverage for future 
negotiations regarding aid. What the unpredictability created was the need for a 
stable USFK, able to execute multiple contingencies that could react to all North 
Korean courses of action.     
As the dust settled on the incidents of 2010, inter-Korean relations returned to the 
status quo of antagonism accompanied by threats of retribution. The death of Kim 
Jong-Il and the subsequent announcement of Kim Jung-Un as the North’s Supreme 
Commander created an environment of uncertainty on the peninsula. A long period 
of national mourning did nothing to indicate how the new leader would approach 
inter-Korean issues. North Korea’s position became clear after strongly worded 
statements from Pyongyang were directed at South Korea during North Korea’s 
traditional New Year’s Day message. North Korea reiterated its previous refusal to 
deal with Lee Myung-Bak and his conservative government, after Lee’s MB Policy 
cancelled the unconditional economic and food aid to the North unless it dismantled 
its nuclear programme. North Korea also explicitly demanded the removal of U.S. 
troops stationed in Korea.68 Yoo Ho-Yeol Professor of North Korean studies at Korea 
University noted that such threats immediately following the leadership succession, 
were “aimed at increasing leverage in future negotiations to revoke sanctions and 
wrest more aid.”69    
The U.S. has taken a cautious approach to North Korea, preferring to wait until the 
new leader has settled in and shown his intentions before making any decisions on 
diplomatic re-engagement and the resumption of aid. Of particular concern to the 
alliance was that the death of Kim Jong-Il might de-stabilise the North Korean 
military in the event of a power struggle. However the immediate elevation of Kim 
Jung-Un as the supreme military commander assuaged such fears. Although the 
power transfer from father to son seemed to be a seamless, Washington remains 
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alert to the situation, maintaining regular communications with its East-Asian allies 
while ensuring that the USFK remains on high alert.  
The most obvious effect Kim Jong-Il’s death has had on the USFK is that the 
proposed changes to its command structure and strategic placement have been 
delayed, until Kim Jung-Un makes his intentions towards the U.S. – ROK alliance 
known. Nonetheless in a show of solidarity, Washington released a statement saying 
“we remain committed to stability on the Korean peninsula, and to the freedom and 
security of our allies.”70 This was obviously a direct rebuttal of Pyongyang’s call for 
U.S. troop withdrawal from the Korean peninsula immediately following Kim Jong-Il’s 
death. To accentuate its stance, the USFK was placed on high alert as Lee Myung-
Bak called a National Security Council meeting to discuss contingency plans. The 
planned changes to the USFK were also shifted back to their original timelines. 
While the U.S. has postponed its plans to donate a significant amount of aid until the 
leadership situation in North Korea has settled, China has taken the lead and 
donated a large quantity of food and fuel in a clear sign that it remain the North’s 
closest ally and largest benefactor. Washington had been hoping that their offer of 
aid could be the catalyst to resume nuclear disarmament talks in light of Kim Jong-
Il’s poor health, with the North willing to suspend its uranium enrichment programme 
in exchange for food aid and a relaxation of economic sanctions.71 However the U.S. 
– ROK alliance remains hopeful that Kim Jung-Un will be receptive to multi-lateral 
negotiations once he has settled into his role and received the aid promised to his 
father before he died, regardless of the continuing presence of the USFK.   
However official statements broadcast on North Korean state television calling for all 
citizens to rally in support of the new leader against enemies of the state, cast 
doubts on the North’s true intentions regarding its nuclear programme. These 
broadcasts followed on from earlier statements made by the North Korean Defence 
Ministry immediately following Kim Jong-Il’s death, asking for the withdrawal of U.S. 
troops and a stop to what it believed was joint U.S. – ROK provocation towards their 
country. Statements such as these have led the U.S. – ROK alliance to believe that 
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the leader may have changed but the ideology has not. This has placed plans for 
positive re-engagement with the North on hold and meant that the USFK’s 
deterrence effect remains an important factor.   
The Effect of China’s Rise on the Korean Defence Dynamic 
One of the major foreign policy challenges for the U.S. concerning East-Asia is the 
need to recognise the rise of China’s influence in the region, while maintaining a 
commitment to strengthening alliances with traditional allies such as South Korea. 
Conversely, China’s foreign policy conundrum is that the U.S. remains a key 
contributor to the economic development that has led to its rising status and 
influence as a world power.72 With China’s exponential economic growth making it 
an economic superpower, the government has shifted its long-term policy focus onto 
increasing China’s regional influence and becoming a leading political power in Asia. 
The U.S. retains a strong influence in Asia and alliances with Japan and South 
Korea have grown stronger in recent years, both economically and strategically. 
However with both Japan and South Korea pragmatically strengthening economic 
and diplomatic ties with China, the U.S. now sees the ‘China factor’ as the biggest 
challenge to its regional influence even with the improved U.S. – China relations in 
recent years.73  
China and the U.S. have historically been on opposite sides of the inter-Korean 
conflict. During the Korean War, the U.S. encroachment onto Chinese territory as 
well as the shared communist ideology between North Korea and China led to 
China’s entry into the conflict. During the period since the signing of the armistice 
and the end of the Cold War, relations had remained stable to the point of cordiality. 
However China’s inherent mistrust of the ‘U.S. hegemony’ and a clash of strategic 
interests meant that any meaningful diplomacy did not develop.74 The economic rise 
of China led to its growth and globalisation as a nation. China’s development as a 
global force also led to greater diplomatic ties with U.S., as the two most powerful 
actors in the region looked at working together to promote regional stability in spite of 
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fundamental differences.75 The Korean peninsula and its surrounding issues are 
central to the strategic agendas of both China and the U.S. in East Asia.  
Even with the conflicts of the past, both the U.S. and China have officially maintained 
that they share common interests concerning Korea, such as stability on the 
peninsula and meaningful diplomacy to improve relations between the North and the 
South. However, “in light of their vast differences in strategic visions, political 
systems, social values, and objectives, let alone diverging interests over bilateral and 
regional issues, it is far more logical and more empirically valid to say that the United 
States and China are likely to remain divergent over peninsula issues as well.”76  
China has been able to wield a greater influence in East-Asia because of the 
economic interdependence that now exists between China and other East-Asian 
states of influence such as South Korea and Japan. As a result of this 
interdependence the actions and decisions of Beijing are now affecting all aspects of 
policy making for these East-Asian states, not just economic policy. Although this 
has not had a detrimental effect on U.S. security ties with South Korea and Japan, it 
has created a policy issue concerning how the alliances deal with a “modernising 
and more powerful Chinese military financed by the growing Chinese economy.”77   
The growing relationship between South Korea and China has not led to a 
corresponding drop in the strength of the U.S. – ROK alliance. It is also notable for 
its total lack of military co-operation. China seems to maintain a wary but diplomatic 
stance concerning the future of the USFK. It has however demonstrated the 
pragmatism of international relations between East-Asian states by providing “a 
model for how deepening economic relations can bring two capitals together 
politically.”78 To put the economic relationship in context, by the mid-2000s China 
had become South Korea’s largest trading partner and largest buyer of South 
Korean exported goods.  
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Lee Myung-Bak’s successful efforts to positively develop the U.S. – ROK defence 
relationship had little effect on South Korea’s improving economic and diplomatic 
relationship with China. This has been supplemented by regular public visits by 
Chinese leaders to Seoul to consolidate the shifting image of China as an archaic, 
ideologically incompatible state, to a “benign, pragmatic economic partner.”79  
However, even with relations at a political level continually improving there have 
been underlying concerns amongst the South Korean public regarding Sino – ROK 
relations. With the growing military capability of China resulting from massive 
financial investment, South Koreans are asking questions of its motives as well as 
questioning the ability of the USFK to match such a growing force if necessary. 
Although not officially stated, China’s rapidly expanding military has become a major 
consideration for the future strategic posture of the USFK.  
The tensions caused by these concerns were manifested in controversies 
surrounding historical issues, such as the assertion by Chinese politicians that the 
‘Koguryo Kingdom (37 B.C. – 668 A.D.)’ was a part of Chinese territory and not an 
independent Korean entity as Koreans claimed. This fed into South Korean paranoia 
and led to accusations of Chinese hegemonic ambitions in Asia. Combined with 
concerns over continuing Chinese support for North Korea, the image of China as a 
benevolent economic partner began to erode.80 With public outrage rising on both 
sides, officials from Beijing and Seoul worked together to resolve the controversy 
and Beijing sent an envoy to negotiate an agreement. A five-point agreement was 
subsequently drawn-up which managed to placate Korean concerns. Even with its 
resolution, the controversy proved that underlying tensions still existed and could 
lead to a shift away from the close relationship in recent years. This was highlighted 
by a Rand Corporation study that noted “growing concerns and anxieties about 
Chinese economic policymaking and diplomacy show that the honeymoon in 
Chinese – South Korean relations is decidedly over.”81        
When discussing the security environment on the Korean peninsula, the effect of  
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China’s long-term strategy to increase its influence on the region and push the U.S. 
to the periphery must be examined. China has at times adopted a confrontational 
posture towards the U.S. and its hard-line stance towards the North, which has 
served to exacerbate the disagreements on issues such as the North Korean nuclear 
issue. Recent criticism of U.S. moves to expand its military influence in the Asia-
Pacific region through joint military exercises with East Asian allies, demonstrates 
China’s desire to reduce the influence of the U.S. in the region. However as regional 
stability is high on strategic China’s agenda, outright criticism of U.S. – ROK plans to 
solidify the USFK’s future and increase its capability has not been forthcoming. The 
two military entities merely remain in a wary state of fake indifference.   
It can be seen then that in spite of the advances made by China in building 
relationships with East-Asian partners, they still lag behind the U.S. as preferred 
bilateral alliance partners. South Korea in particular has been looking to “maintain 
good relations on the basis of, rather than instead of a close relationship with the 
United States.”82 Evidence of this preference could be seen in a 2009 CSIS survey 
where 94% of South Korean respondents felt that the U.S. were a greater force for 
peace in Asia compared to the 6% who responded in favour of China.83 In addition to 
this, South Korean’s believed that the U.S “will continue to be the main source of 
dissuasion, deterrence, and defence” in the region.84 With the future of the USFK 
seemingly secure, the future direction of the U.S. – ROK – China triumvirate rests on 
its respective reactions to North Korean policy.          
The Effect of Domestic Politics on the USFK     
The upcoming 2012 presidential election in South Korea will be conducted during a 
period of upheaval on the Korean Peninsula, with the leadership change in North 
Korea, the passage of the KORUS FTA, and the re-emergence of the progressive 
Democratic Party (DP) making the outcome unpredictable. Elections will be 
conducted for both the National Assembly and presidency in South Korea, with the 
maximum presidential term of five years having been served by Lee Myung-Bak. Lee 
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has put his weight behind Park Geun-Hye as his preferred GNP presidential 
candidate with software company CEO Ahn Cheol-Soo the most serious rival for the 
candidacy. However the candidacy race is the least of the GNPs problems with 
approval rating steadily declining during Lee’s term to the extent that polls are 
showing greater support for the DP. The stable economy remains the strongest 
factor in favour of the GNP, while polls also show that support for the U.S. – ROK 
defence alliance remains strong in the wake of uncertainty regarding North Korea’s 
intentions after its leadership transfer. However the controversy over the KORUS 
FTA as well as national unrest at the growing unemployment rate and rich-poor gap, 
has allowed the DP to become a legitimate challenger to the GNP.  
South Korea managed to weather the global economic crisis through a combination 
of fiscal frugality and maintaining a strong trade surplus on the back of key exports 
such as electronics and automobiles. However the government focus on supporting 
large conglomerates, rising inflation, a growing unemployment rate, and growing 
economic inequality, led to a swing in public opinion towards a more liberal public 
policy.85 A study by Hankyoreh newspaper showed that conglomerate profits rose by 
73% in 2011, while workers’ incomes rose only 1.3% over the same period.86 The 
result of by-elections in 2011 demonstrated this discontent towards the GNP with the 
DP scoring significant victories in areas such as Bundang, a traditional GNP 
stronghold. The poor performance in the polls has had repercussions on the U.S. – 
ROK alliance, with the KORUS FTA and key defence strategy plans on hold as the 
pro-U.S. GNP hastily strategized a campaign to counter their slide in popular 
support.         
In recent South Korean presidential elections, the key issue has usually been the 
economy and how it should be managed to improve the people’s standard of living. 
However the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents raised the question of whether the 
hard-line approach of the MB Policy is one that should be persevered with. The 
unpredictability demonstrated by the North in those incidents has exacerbated the 
security concerns of South Korea.87 The North Korean leadership succession to Kim 
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Jung-Un has only added to this uncertainty.88 The strong statements of support for 
Kim Jong-Un on North Korean state television has raised fears that the new regime 
will “conduct another round of provocations, including a third nuclear test, to escalate 
tensions and distract the country’s attention from internal failures, as well as boost 
internal unity for the succession to Kim Jung-Un.”89   
As a result, the defence issue has risen in priority compared to previous election 
campaigns where the primary focus has been the economy and associated standard 
of living. The support for the U.S. – ROK defence alliance remains high because of 
the guaranteed security provided by such a powerful ally. Surveys showed that less 
than a quarter of those polled believe that the country’s military could deter North 
Korean aggression without U.S. help.90 Therefore because of the influence of 
popular opinion in South Korea, the planned changes to the USFK command 
structure and resourcing is likely to be maintained regardless of the election result.    
However polls also showed that even with popular support for the USFK, the public 
believe that the U.S. wields too much influence on what should be an equal 
partnership.91 The public believes having a government that is an equal alliance 
partner, will give their country the freedom to compromise and negotiate on issues 
that the U.S. may disagree on. This could be seen in the controversy surrounding the 
KORUS FTA and North Korean flashpoint incidents, where the hard-line strategy of 
the U.S. – ROK alliance polarised sections of the population. The population 
maintained support for the U.S. – ROK alliance’s refusal to back down against North 
Korean aggression. However most believe that diplomacy must be the first option to 
resolve an issue before choosing to retaliate, which may lead to an escalation of 
conflict.  The pragmatic nature of domestic politics in South Korea has meant that 
any major changes to the U.S. – ROK alliance such as the KORUS FTA and USFK 
command handover, will be implemented after the National Assembly elections.92 In 
such a pivotal period for domestic politics, the incumbent GNP will not risk the 
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possibility of voter disillusionment over controversial decisions just as a new 
government will not risk changing decisions made with the blessing of the majority.           
With major agreements on the KORUS FTA and USFK structural change already 
signed off, the U.S. has been looking with interest at the domestic political situation 
in South Korea. The U.S. – ROK alliance had gone from strength to strength 
following the incidents of 2010, as Presidents Lee and Obama continued to co-
ordinate a joint response strategy as well as a long-term security plan. The alliance 
had mobilised the USFK rapidly, working “to stage major exercises to signal alliance 
solidarity and bolster deterrence. The allies reviewed procedures and defences and 
took steps to ensure joint deterrence in the Yellow Sea.”93 Lee and his MB Policy 
had placed a major emphasis on closer ties with the U.S., looking to repair the 
damage that successive progressive governments had inflicted on the alliance 
through their insistence on unconditional engagement with the North without U.S. 
consultation. Even with the inroads made into synchronising the alliance’s strategic 
direction, the strong possibility that the DP wins the upcoming election could mean a 
return to the Sunshine Policy abandoned by Lee and the GNP.94    
The Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents combined with the uncertainty over both 
Korea’s future leadership, contributed to the decision to postpone the transfer of 
USFK operational command to the ROK by a minimum of three years.95 Even with  
the delay, the U.S. remains committed to the USFK modification plan. Both 
governments are determined to maintain the new schedule for command handover 
and force restructuring. This issue is one of the few on the election agenda that both 
the GNP and DP have agreed upon, albeit for different reasons. The GNP believes 
that transferring command will allow South Korea to “take the lead in its own 
defence, with full support from its American ally. Doing so will enhance South Korean 
military leadership and capabilities and strengthen the domestic political basis of 
support in Korea for a continuing alliance relationship with the United States.”96  
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The DNP maintains that it supports a continuing alliance with the U.S. However it 
believes that taking over sole operational control of the USFK will allow greater 
decision-making freedom without pressure from Washington, as well as reducing the 
number of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula. This would create a spirit of 
goodwill towards Kim Jung-Un’s North Korea by satisfying one of the conditions it 
asked for, in exchange for renewed bilateral discussions on inter-Korean issues. The 
defence budget has also been a point of conjecture for the DNP, who believe that 
the maintenance of the USFK must not be at the expense of domestic spending on 
areas of concern. While it acknowledges the security provided by the alliance is 
important with the unpredictable leadership situation in North Korea, costs signed off 
by the GNP such as U.S. troop relocation have been criticised as unnecessary. 
Washington watches the election campaign with trepidation at the possibility of a DP 
win, with U.S. defence analysts believing that such a result could set back the 
progress made since the launch of the MB Policy in 2007.97        
Arguments Against the USFK Remaining on the Korean Peninsula 
Since the signing of the armistice in 1953 that signalled an inter-Korean truce, the 
DPRK has instigated a number of direct military and terrorist attacks on both U.S. 
and ROK elements. However since the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 in 1987 by 
North Korean agents, “Pyongyang has eschewed blatant acts of war in favour of 
diplomatic brinkmanship.”98 The Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong Island shelling in 
2010 represented a return by North Korea to the strategy of the past, where 
aggressive acts of war were initiated under the pretence of self-defence. A strong 
U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula was seen as a deterrent against 
North Korean military aggression.  
Although the U.S. had reduced total troop numbers during the 2000s as a result of 
military commitments to the Middle-East and an agreed incremental handover of joint 
forces command back to the ROK, the main U.S. defence commitment remained 
largely unchanged.99 The planned command handover has been pushed back  
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further and the South Korean reliance on the U.S. – ROK defence alliance remains 
as strong as ever. Critics of the continuing presence of U.S. troops on the Korean 
peninsula believe that this reliance has become unnecessarily strong in light of 
South Korea’s growing defence capabilities and consistently robust economy. 
Throughout the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, South Korea has acted in close 
consultation with the U.S. This is reflective of a defence alliance that has always 
found its uses and stood the test of time since its inception in 1953. However with 
such a long-standing alliance, there is the expectation to act in manner that takes 
into account the partner’s interests as well as their own. With the military might of the 
U.S. second to none globally, South Korea seems the partner most likely to benefit 
the most from such a defence relationship.100 The U.S. looked to actively assist 
South Korea’s desire for greater strategic capability by providing defence hardware 
in the form of ballistic missile technology, as well as advanced information assets 
such as communication nodes and computing systems. With the tactical command 
handover to occur in addition to the technological assistance provided, the 
framework of the alliance transformed into a division between U.S. strategy and ROK 
tactics. As a result, the command and decision-making entity in the alliance has 
more commonly been the U.S.  
This was especially apparent during the early years of the alliance, when South 
Korea was recovering from the war with an export led economic plan advised by 
Washington. This was not an undesirable situation for both nations, as South Korea 
benefited through U.S. military protection and economic assistance while the U.S. 
benefited from the strategic advantage and influence of having such a strong ally in 
the region. However opponents of the alliance’s continuation believe that the rapid 
rise in South Korea’s military capability and economic clout has changed the nature 
of the relationship, to the extent that the preferred policies of the two partners are 
likely to make such a smooth relationship unlikely.     
An example of how U.S. interests would influence joint responses to North Korean 
aggression could be seen in its response to the Cheonan sinking. The U.S. publicly 
stood by its alliance partner South Korea in condemning North Korea after the 
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independent U.N. report on the sinking was released. This was in direct contrast to 
Beijing’s public statements calling for measured diplomacy with North Korea for the 
sake of regional stability, rather than retaliation and further sanctions. However 
Washington reportedly agreed with China’s response behind closed doors, urging 
South Korea to show restraint in its responding course of action. This stance was 
attributed to the fact that the U.S. was committed to implementing the USFK 
transformation plan it had drafted with South Korea. Any head-on military response 
would require a mobilisation of the USFK in anticipation of direct conflict with North 
Korea, during a vulnerable period of transition. From the U.S.’ viewpoint, it “had 
reason to insist on a peaceful response. It would be folly for the United States to go 
to war over the sinking of the Cheonan.”101 This strategic decision by Washington 
trumped South Korean concerns that favouring discourse over a military response 
would embolden North Korea by showing weakness in the face of its belligerence.  
Doug Bandow’s report on the U.S. – ROK alliance regards it as a negative burden to 
both partners. He feels that South Korea does not control its own strategic decisions, 
while the U.S. is maintaining their defence presence in South Korea at a great cost 
when the nation can defence itself.102 Critics in South Korea believe the Cheonan 
fallout demonstrated the diverging interests between the two traditional allies, and 
provided a strong message that “where positions diverge between the two countries, 
decisions over South Korean security will still be made in Washington, not Seoul.”103 
This did nothing to refute claims that the U.S. – ROK defence alliance was not equal, 
but one in the mould of a senior-junior partnership.  
This provided ammunition to anti-American groups in both South and North Korea 
who believed that this inequality was symptomatic of U.S. ambitions for hegemony in 
the region. These groups cited the pressure placed on South Korea to provide 
military assistance for the U.S. led war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq during the 
Bush administration, as further examples of how the U.S. is taking advantage of its 
role as the senior alliance partner to serve its own interests. If this was the case now 
they argued, the U.S. had the ability to use South Korea as a strategic base for any 
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regional operations, whether it is against China or North Korea regardless of the 
impact it could have on the Korean people.104     
Although South Korea loses the ability to make independent command decisions 
based on its own strategic interests, Bandow argues that such a one-sided alliance 
places a greater burden on the senior partner. South Korea has been a loyal ally of 
the U.S. that can be relied on for mutual support, with extensive economic and 
strategic ties in the region. However he believes that the end of the Cold War has 
“sharply diminished South Korea’s security importance – relevance, even – to the 
United States. With no connection to a potentially aggressive soviet union (and to a 
lesser extent, a virulently revolutionary China), North Korea is an irrelevant strategic 
backwater.”105 Critics also point out that the threat level is too low for the defence 
commitment of the U.S., even with the nuclear research programme developed by 
North Korea. There are almost 30,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea as of 
2010. Yet even with North Korea’s desire to develop its military technology, along 
with the fact that it has the fourth largest army in the world in terms of manpower, 
one U.S. carrier group can be quickly mobilised and possesses more firepower.106 
The nuclear issue and a history of unpredictable North Korean behaviour remain 
concerns, yet nothing suggests that the North is suicidal enough to utilise what 
nuclear weapons it may have.    
Nuclear non-proliferation in the region remains a high strategic priority for 
Washington, especially with China slowly gaining in influence as a regional power. 
However opponents of the U.S. garrison force have promoted the option of 
Washington lobbying for nuclear non-proliferation from a distance.107 The example of 
the six-party talks has been used to demonstrate how multi-lateral diplomacy has the 
ability to give nations the platform to have an influence on regional matters without 
using military resources. This is especially pertinent with the long and drawn out war 
on terror in Afghanistan having such a huge cost on the U.S. military in both 
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manpower and defence expenditure. Additionally, the presence of U.S. forces has 
been cited by China in particular as a barrier to North Korean diplomacy and 
compliance with the other member states during the six-party talks. As a result, the 
six-party talks have broken down, with North Korea even ignoring requests by its 
strongest ally China to commit to further talks. Critics of the U.S. forces in South 
Korea acknowledge that the Cheonan incident may have shaken the stability of 
regional security in East-Asia. However they point out that the U.S. military “had not 
even been placed on a higher state of readiness”108 raising questions about the U.S. 
perceptions of North Korea as a genuine threat.    
The strong economic position of South Korea is seen by opponents of the USFK’s 
presence as proof that the country can stand on its own two feet. South Korea has 
the financial clout to fund purchases of military technology as well as having defence 
agreements with powerful allies that allows easy procurement of such weaponry. In 
stark contrast North Korea is impoverished, with international sanctions and 
embargos meaning that it does not have the means or the support to procure leading 
military technology.109 Even China, its last remaining ally of note is unlikely to risk 
international condemnation by intervening in any inter-Korean conflict or provide 
support in the form of military weaponry. China’s strategic focus remains on 
maintaining its economic growth, promoting regional stability through multilateral 
diplomacy, and taking a leadership role in Asia. As China’s unconditional backing of 
North Korea becomes less guaranteed, its relationship with South Korea maintains 
an upward trajectory. 
Although their nuclear ambitions remain a concern, North Korea does not have the 
technological means or desire to initiate a nuclear stand-off.110 Its military strength 
lies in the sheer number of manoeuvre elements it possesses. In terms of leading 
military technology it is outmatched by South Korea alone. Therefore critics continue 
to state that “exaggerating the North Korean military threat to South Korea”111 can no 
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longer be used to justify the sizeable U.S. military presence. South Korea has the 
defence budget to increase military spending and negate the North Korean strength 
in numbers, yet it does not do so as a result of U.S. defence subsidies. 
Understandably South Korea is loath to lose the defence benefits the U.S. – ROK 
alliance provides, which has allowed the U.S. to increasingly dominate the terms of 
the partnership. Even with this being the case, the financial cost of South Korea 
maintaining the same defence outputs without the presence of the U.S. forces would 
be enormous. South Korea’s National Defence Ministry admitted as much stating 
that “if the USFK should be withdrawn, it would take an astronomical amount of 
additional defence expenditures to compensate for its absence.”112       
Supporters of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula, believe that 
the South Korean claims that it does not have the means to replace the USFK are 
untrue and a ploy to continue taking advantage of the alliance. The USFK benefits 
not only include a deterrent effect on North Korean aggression, but also the 
discounted military technology and economic benefits that having such a strong 
defence relationship entails. Jae-Jung Suh notes in his articles that Seoul is 
overplaying the importance of the USFK in the security of South Korea, and “while 
the U.S. military adds to the South’s capability, some of its contribution may be 
superfluous, especially given that Seoul is already enjoying military advantages. The 
alliance’s supplementary effect therefore, is smaller than it seems at first.”113 Since 
the Yeonpyeong shelling, the security of South Korea has been a high priority for the 
voting public compared to previous years when inter-Korean relations remained 
antagonistic but stable. If this is the case, there would be little disapproval from the 
South Korean public if the decision was made to bolster defence spending. Yet the 
Defence Ministry seems content to maintain the status quo and lean on the military 
assistance of the USFK when they could do more themselves.114      
Critics of the USFK have conceded that although they believe the U.S. – ROK 
military alliance is outdated, recent events have shown that the alliance partners 
remain committed military partners with a jointly developed strategy for security on 
                                                          
112
 Suh, J. ‘Allied to Race? The U.S. – Korea Alliance and Arms Race’, Asian Perspective, 33(4), p.122.  
113
 Ibid, p.123.  
114
 Bandow, D. (2010). The U.S. – South Korea Alliance: Outdated, Unnecessary, and Dangerous, Foreign Policy 
Briefing No.90, Washington: The Cato Institute, p.6.  
Page 47 of 63 
 
the Korean Peninsula. The vocal criticism of North Korea and pledges to support the 
ROK by Washington in response to the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, 
demonstrate that the U.S. – ROK defence alliance remains solid. The resumption of 
six-party talks remains a viable option for the U.S. to remain an influence in the 
region without having a military presence in South Korea, as it is the only official U.S. 
– North Korean channel for dialogue.115 However, North Korea has refused calls 
from the U.S. and China to resume these talks because of the U.N. sanctions placed 
against it for continuing to defy the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. As a result, the 
most viable first step proposed by supporters of the USFK withdrawal is the transfer 
of joint operational control to the ROK. This would set the precedence for greater 
defence responsibility on the Korean Peninsula to the ROK, allowing the gradual 
reduction of both the USFK and the South Korean tendency to rely on it.        
The number of those supporting the withdrawal of the USFK remains steady on both 
sides of the alliance. However, the fact remains that those with policy making 
influence remain convinced that retaining the status quo will send a message of 
strength and remain a deterring force against North Korean aggression. The majority 
of South Korea’s population supports the continued presence of U.S. forces on the 
Korean Peninsula because of the security guarantee it provides.116 This is a view 
shared by the current commander of the USFK General Walter Sharp who stated 
that in the present climate of uncertainty in North Korea “there should be no question 
left in Pyongyang’s mind about the joint ROK – U.S. commitment to fight together.”117  
Although the USFK command transfer to the ROK is still going ahead, it has been 
postponed until 2015 because of the importance of remaining stable during such an 
uncertain period in North Korea. The North Korean military has shown its 
unpredictability with the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents in 2010, and will be 
keen to demonstrate solidarity behind its new leadership. Diplomacy from a distance 
has a role to play, yet it does not provide the security and strategic advantage that 
the USFK offers. The financial cost of maintaining the USFK may be high, yet the 
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strategic and economic benefits of maintaining a strong U.S. – ROK alliance 
outweigh the costs. Keeping a U.S. military presence in South Korea remains a key 
component of maintaining the legitimacy of the alliance.           
Why the USFK Should Remain on the Korean Peninsula 
The U.S. strategic objectives in Korea have remained largely unchanged over the 
four major phases since the signing of the armistice. The decades immediately 
following the armistice saw the growth of the U.S. garrison presence in South Korea, 
which by deterring North Korean aggression allowed South Korea to rebuild and 
grow after the war. The second phase encompassed the Cold War period and with 
each of the Korea’s aligned with opposing sides, the primary aim of deterring North 
Korean aggression became even more pertinent. As the Cold War ended, the 
primary defence objective remained the same.  
However the methods to achieve this objective began to expand, as the possibility of 
diplomacy with North Korea increased with the fall of the iron curtain. The U.S. 
began taking steps to not only ensure the security of its South Korean allies, but 
move towards a possible reunification of Korea. The September 11 attacks brought 
about a new phase of global security with the U.S. led War on Terror, bringing about 
a change in U.S. strategy regarding East-Asia. The USFK continued to serve as a 
deterrent against North Korean aggression but also assigned its forces as a 
stabilising entity for the whole region. Finally with U.S. forces pulling out of 
Afghanistan, Washington shifted its strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific where South 
Korea remained its staunchest ally.   
During the successive progressive governments in South Korea, it seemed that the 
diverging ideologies and interests between the alliance partners would result in 
either the scale-down or dissolution of the long standing alliance. The progressive 
governments placed a greater emphasis on pursuing an unconditional engagement 
policy with North Korea, rather than developing the U.S. – ROK alliance. Even during 
this difficult period for the alliance, observers noted that “there was an increasing 
overlap between the underlying political interests of both countries on a broad range 
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of strategic issues”118 where the continuing presence of the USFK could be the base 
by which co-operation could be rebuilt. The return of the conservative GNP under 
Lee Myung-Bak and his MB Policy allowed these mutual strategic and political 
interests to be addressed co-operatively, under a reaffirmed U.S. – ROK alliance. 
Lee declared the restoration of this alliance as his top priority, with the 2009 U.S. – 
ROK Joint Vision Statement signed by Lee and Obama a major step towards a 
confirmed future for the USFK. The identification and accomplishment of joint 
strategic objectives appeared to be a methodology used by the alliance to prove the 
continuing feasibility and relevance of the USFK.  
The U.S. – ROK alliance’s vision for the USFK during Lee’s presidency highlighted 
the importance of joint planning towards a mutual strategic purpose, under a 
command structure that is operationally focused and promotes effective co-
operation. Presidents Lee and Obama’s Joint Vision Statement of 2009 and the ten-
year U.S. Ministry of Defence plan introduced in 2011, are examples of both partners 
identifying these characteristics as vital components of a successful future alliance. 
This has enabled the alliance to maintain the USFK’s relevance by using it as a 
strategic asset to remain a powerful regional force. This creates the “opportunity to 
operationalisze U.S. – ROK co-operation on off peninsula security issues to 
strengthen alliance capabilities, reflecting South Korea’s growing interests and 
capacity.”119 The USFK is used as a platform by the U.S. to maintain a strong 
foothold in East-Asia, preserving regional stability by creating a balance of power in 
light of China’s growing influence.             
By moving forward with a coherent and strategically focused long-term plan, the U.S. 
– ROK alliance has shed the patron-benefactor dynamic that characterised the 
relationship during its formative years. The command and institutional structures 
have been modified to correspond with both alliance partners’ military capabilities 
and objectives. The most notable change has been the planned operational 
command transition of the USFK, with South Korea taking a leading role in its own 
national defence. This has addressed the issue of feasibility by placing less of a 
burden on the U.S., and was conducive to Washington pledging a long-term 
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continuation of support to USFK maintenance. This commitment to co-operation has 
allowed the beginnings of the transition to occur seamlessly, as the mutual strategic 
interests of the alliance partners are given equal consideration. With the USFK set to 
remain an integral part of the U.S. – ROK alliance during and after the command 
handover, “the main factors shaping the international security posture and needs of 
the two countries must continue to be developed into a shared strategic vision”120 if 
the alliance is to remain feasible.   
The U.S. remains a global leader both economically and in the area of security. It 
has maintained this strong level of influence in the Asian region principally through 
co-operation with allied states such as South Korea and Japan, in addition to its long 
standing garrison presence in both countries. In return for the strategic advantages 
having such a presence in the region entails, the U.S. has shouldered the burden of 
leadership as well as a commitment to financially invest in the maintenance of the 
USFK. However regardless of the costs, the presence of the USFK provides a 
strategic focal point that allows the alliance to flourish as both nations work to a 
common plan aimed at achieving joint objectives. This has allowed the U.S. to 
maintain a solid foothold in a region it has identified as crucial in its strategic vision, 
while allowing South Korea to continue developing its military capabilities in relative 
security.121 At the same time, “South Korea’s diplomatic profile has become more 
multidimensional” as its political dependence on the U.S. becomes less pronounced.     
The renewed focus on the U.S. – ROK alliance brought about by the development of 
a joint strategic plan, has improved the public perception of both the alliance and the 
role of the USFK in South Korea. The Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents served to 
highlight the unpredictability of the North, especially as they followed a period of 
relative calm in inter-Korean relations. The South Korean public felt that relations 
had failed to improve to the extent they had hoped for during successive progressive 
governments that had distanced themselves from stronger U.S. – ROK defence ties, 
and favoured unconditional engagement with the North.122 The return of the 
conservative government was ushered in emphatically by a South Korean public 
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supportive of a return to stronger U.S. – ROK ties and a strong USFK committed to 
providing security against external threats.  
Even with recent domestic trends showing a drop in support for the conservative 
GNP and a steady rise in popularity of the progressive DP, support for the USFK’s 
long-term strategy and presence remains strong. Amidst the uncertainty surrounding 
the North Korean leadership change and the rise of China bringing a shift in the 
political dynamic of the region, the bilateral commitment to the USFK has brought a 
welcome element of stability and security to South Korea.     
While the U.S. – ROK alliance has encompassed a broad range of political and 
economic co-operation, the existing structure of security co-operation has been 
critical to sustaining the alliance. The current solidarity of the alliance has derived 
from its close military relationship, with the USFK providing a focal point for bilateral 
diplomacy and co-operation. It has also provided “a basis on which to enhance its 
political leverage in dealing with neighbouring countries and to strengthen its position 
and status in the international community.”123 The defence relationship within the 
alliance has continued to be relevant because of the joint vision on regional security 
and South Korea’s recent willingness to take a lead role in the USFK. This has 
allowed the U.S. to retain a long-term military commitment in South Korea, as the 
financial and command burden is further distributed between the alliance partners. 
The long-term commitment means that the USFK is co-ordinated in a way that 
maximises its combat strength, which allows it to respond in a timely manner to any 
security threats regardless of origin.124                      
The feasibility of the USFK cannot be evaluated without a discussion of the original 
reason for its existence, the deterrence of North Korean military aggression and the 
protection of South Korea from external threats. After a period of relative calm, the 
North Korean security threat has become more pertinent since the Cheonan and 
Yeonpyeong incidents of 2010. The incidents served to both strengthened the U.S. - 
ROK joint defence co-operation and expose the gaps in USFK incident response co-
ordination. This has led to positive measures being taken to rectify issues as a part  
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of USFK restructuring, such as the expansion of joint naval capacity and surge 
capability. Joint military exercises soon followed, as the U.S. – ROK alliance used 
the USFK to demonstrate its ability to mass forces in response to any act of 
aggression.  
This show of force was combined with fresh economic sanctions and a freeze on aid 
from both Washington and Seoul. These measures were consistent with the hard-
line MB policy that sought to deter any belligerent behaviour from the North and 
pressure it to adopt complete denuclearisation. While economic sanctions would hit 
North Korea hard, China’s continuing economic aid meant that the damage inflicted 
would be partially offset. The USFK’s show of force added another level of 
deterrence on top of the economic sanctions and further illustrated its importance to 
South Korean security. Since these measures have been put in place, North Korea 
seems to have focused on renewing dialogue rather than attempting provocation.     
Since the death of Kim Jong-Il and the subsequent succession of his son Kim Jung-
Un, Pyongyang has made official statements that could be perceived as veiled 
threats towards the U.S. – ROK alliance. These statements are based around the 
theme of justified retaliation if North Korea’s sovereignty is threatened by the 
alliance. However they have also expressed a willingness and desire to resume the 
stalled six-party talks without pre-conditions. Observers have viewed these gestures 
with cynicism as the North remains non-committal to denuclearisation, which has 
been the U.S. – ROK alliance’s objective when engaging in diplomacy. Although 
tensions have eased since the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, the instability 
surrounding the leadership succession and the North’s reluctance to commit to 
nuclear non-proliferation show that a tangible threat remains. This has meant that 
co-operation between the alliance partners during the USFK transformation plan and 
OPCON transfer period is vital for security on the peninsula. Therefore the long-term 
commitment by both Seoul and Washington to a strong USFK has been crucial to 
maintain its feasibility.  
In spite of China’s rapid economic development it still remains the North’s greatest 
benefactor, with food and fuel aid continuing despite growing international pressure 
on it to stop until the North agrees on denuclearisation. China has been reluctant to 
criticise North Korea because of its unpredictability, which would only become more 
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volatile if its main ally were to turn its back. Nevertheless, China has maintained a 
commitment towards multilateral diplomacy as a means to promote regional stability. 
When Lee Myung-Bak was elected president he re-aligned Seoul’s foreign policy 
closer to Washington, consolidating the U.S. – ROK alliance and drawing criticism 
from the North. The confirmation of a joint strategic plan and a long-term 
commitment to the USFK presence in South Korea was included in this policy 
reform. Although not openly critical of the USFK and its strategic aims, China 
opposed joint exercises in the Yellow Sea. This stance is consistent with China’s 
primary strategic objective of regional stability, which has often been at odds with the 
U.S. – ROK’s method of imposing sanctions on the North to force their 
denuclearisation. 
It is undeniable that the security order of East-Asia has been influenced by the rise of 
China as a regional power. It is partly in response to this changing dynamic that the 
U.S. – ROK alliance has continued to consolidate its security strategy through 
measures such as the ‘Koreanisation’ of the USFK by transferring operational 
command to the ROK. The release of Obama’s National Security Strategy as well as 
the U.S. – ROK Joint Vision Statement in 2010, defined the future role of the USFK 
and its strategic aims for the region. In response to these consolidation measures, 
China “has been trying to alter the U.S. – ROK alliance with its own political, military, 
and economic tools.”125 China and South Korea retain close economic ties and 
improving diplomatic ties, but a defence relationship is non-existent. China’s 
steadfast support of the North and refusal to impose sanctions as a result of the 
North’s provocations has been a point of conjecture between Beijing and the U.S. – 
ROK alliance. China has pushed for the six-party talks to continue while the alliance 
remains commitment to the security of South Korea by pressuring the North to fully 
denuclearise.  
By continuing its aid to the North, China maintains economic leverage over 
Pyongyang. It has used this leverage to promote stability on the Korean Peninsula 
and preserve its economic growth, by advising North Korea against overt aggression 
in favour of diplomacy. However the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents proved that 
the leverage would only go so far in the face of North Korean volatility. Beijing’s 
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ability to criticise the continuing presence of the USFK under the guise of regional 
stability was taken away, as the North proved once again it could not be controlled. 
Suggestions from certain stakeholders in the region that a new Northeast-Asian 
peace order could emerge were based on the durability of the USFK and the long-
term commitment of the U.S. to the region. Even with the rapid development of 
China’s military, it still lags behind the U.S. in terms of combat power. Therefore with 
its recent upgrade in surge capability, the USFK remains a major force in the region. 
For these reasons, China’s ability to influence the region and its policy decisions 
regarding the Korean Peninsula remain intrinsically intertwined with the U.S. – ROK 
alliance.  
Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated that in spite of the changing regional environment and 
a transitional period for the U.S. – ROK alliance, the USFK remains a feasible entity. 
A number of domestic and international factors that have shaped the current inter-
Korea dynamic have been analysed, to gauge whether the USFK has kept pace with 
the changes to remain a relevant and effective security force.  
The first major domestic factor discussed, was the effect of South Korean public 
opinion on both the USFK and the U.S. – ROK alliance as a whole. Public opinion on 
U.S. – ROK defence matters have a correlation with the perceived threat of North 
Korea and to a lesser extent China. A strong anti-American movement had been 
gaining momentum during the Sunshine Policy era, because of the belief that the 
continuing presence of the USFK would harm the inroads made in inter-Korean 
relations by the engagement first policy. This made any plans to consolidate or 
strengthen the USFK untenable, as public opinion forced the South Korean 
government to take a step back from U.S. plans to strengthen the alliance. However 
the discovery of North Korea’s nuclear programme brought with it a more tangible 
security threat, leading to a shift in South Korean public opinion as they began to 
value the security provided by the USFK. The public felt that the North’s refusal to 
denuclearise was a clear indication that the unconditional engagement policy was 
not in the best interests of South Korean security. With the backing of the public, the 
new conservative government sought to rebuild the shaky U.S. – ROK alliance and 
secure the future of the USFK as an essential component of national security. 
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Once the U.S. – ROK alliance had become stronger on the back of the MB Policy, it 
focused its attention to producing a long term plan that would solidify the alliance, 
modify the USFK to maintain its relevance, and set achievable strategic objectives. 
The joint planning was influenced by the changing global security environment, with 
the Iraq campaign drawing to a close and troop pull-outs from Afghanistan projected 
for late 2012. As a result the U.S. shifted its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region 
amid fears of a possible Chinese regional hegemony, North Korean nuclear weapon 
development, and continuing threats of aggression. To counter this and fully commit 
to the alliance, the U.S. in consultation with South Korea drafted a ten year defence 
plan that included modification of the USFK to improve its effectiveness.  
The plan gave a renewed strategic focus to the alliance by outlining a set of 
achievable objectives within a set timeframe. These included a USFK command 
handover to the ROK and an increase in surge capability without increasing troop 
numbers. These measures proved that the U.S. was fully committed to the alliance, 
the East-Asian region, and a modification of the USFK to maintain its strategic 
effectiveness. By addressing issues such as troop turnover, joint funding with South 
Korea, and surge capability, the alliance has ensured that the USFK remains a 
feasible defence asset that has adapted to the changing regional environment.  
Another domestic factor that has had an external influence on the U.S. – ROK 
alliance is the changing face of domestic politics. The upcoming general election in 
South Korea has seen another shift in public support with the rise in popularity of the 
progressive DP. The DP has targeted the KORUS FTA as another example of the 
power imbalance in the alliance, accusing the South Korean government of being led 
by the U.S. in policy decisions.  They also attacked the response to the Yeonpyeong 
and Cheonan incidents, highlighting the government’s inability to react without 
Washington’s consent. The GNP responded by highlighting the operational 
command handover of the USFK as an example of the balanced nature of the 
alliance. However with the instability in North Korea following the death of Kim Jong-
Il and the Taepyeong missile test, the DP has been reluctant to overtly criticise the 
role of the USFK. Public approval of the USFK and the bilateral defence alliance as a 
whole has remained high, as the majority believe that a strong USFK is an essential 
element of national security and regional stability. .  
Page 56 of 63 
 
With the release of Washington’s ten year defence plan and the USFK restructure 
projected to be complete in 2015, it can be seen that the alliance has favoured a 
long-term strategic vision over short-term gains. With North Korea’s new leader 
seemingly willing to engage in diplomacy but continuing to ignore calls for 
denuclearisation, the stability of the Korean Peninsula remains uncertain. The 
alliance has stated that that it is receptive to diplomacy, but is unwilling to proceed 
until North Korea shows a genuine intent to abandon its nuclear programme. China 
has also maintained that its stance on Korean relations is one of peacemaker, with 
Beijing again pushing for multilateral diplomacy such as the failed six-party talks. As 
a result while the major stakeholders in the region have each stated their position 
regarding the Korean Peninsula, a stalemate has been reached until the North is 
willing to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Until then, the USFK remains a key security 
guarantee for South Korea and a platform through which the U.S. can maintain a 
presence in a region that has become its new strategic focus.  
In conclusion, it is clear to see that because of the current security climate in East-
Asia the USFK remains as relevant as ever. North Korea remains a tangible security 
threat with the installation of Kim Jung-Un as leader appearing to have no effect on 
its position regarding the U.S. – ROK alliance or nuclear proliferation. While not 
destabilising the situation, China’s unchanging position has meant that the alliance 
cannot fully depend on its support, which was demonstrated during the incidents of 
2010. The feasibility of the USFK has been established by consistently strong public 
support in South Korea which has always been an influential factor on Seoul’s choice 
of foreign policy. As a result the alliance has moved quickly to consolidate the future 
of the USFK, by outlining a long-term plan that addresses its past limitations and 
takes into consideration the changing regional environment.  
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